[148316] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Explaining PK to grandma
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Wed Nov 27 23:35:27 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2013 14:32:35 +1000
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <CAMm+Lwj6k0WxXCdfYBh4gjbrud9+dqFNXx2XP84n+7vYUe5rOA@mail.gmail.com>
Reply-To: jamesd@echeque.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 2013-11-28 07:39, Phillip Hallam-Baker wrote:
> The NSA can't compromise every endpoint without being noticed.
For defending against NSA, we don't really have to prevent active
attacks. We merely have to make it reasonably feasible for the
seriously sophisticated paranoid to have a chance of detecting active
attacks.
If very powerful adversary gets observed observing, it loses, since the
information is valuable to its adversaries.
The guy in Nigeria, on the other hand, will have no hesitation in
committing active attacks and will not much worry even if a very large
proportion of them get detected.
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