[148454] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Fwd: [IP] 'We cannot trust' Intel and Via's
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (ianG)
Sat Dec 14 02:00:59 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sat, 14 Dec 2013 09:49:12 +0300
From: ianG <iang@iang.org>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com, John Kelsey <crypto.jmk@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <86CC5021-CF61-4F42-83F3-C7CBC741C414@gmail.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 13/12/13 21:24 PM, John Kelsey wrote:
> Why not just XOR RD_RAND outputs with Yarrow outputs? That guarantees strong results if either one is good.
That would be to reinvent Yarrow?
If that were known as Linux's approach, and RDRAND where spiked, it
would be a simple matter to spike the RDRAND in microcode again (a
known/suspected capability).
Perhaps to unXOR the contents of the previous instruction and XOR in the
secret stream...
iang
_______________________________________________
The cryptography mailing list
cryptography@metzdowd.com
http://www.metzdowd.com/mailman/listinfo/cryptography
