[148795] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Fwd: [IP] RSA Response to Media Claims Regarding
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Gutmann)
Sat Dec 28 10:51:20 2013
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sat, 28 Dec 2013 22:03:45 +1300
From: Peter Gutmann <pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz>
To: hallam@gmail.com, mitch@niftyegg.com
In-Reply-To: <CAAMy4UTTCuueeEVORAyPiEvodJfMGrjsFo0O9Q-oATJ+TN9Kvg@mail.gmail.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com, waywardgeek@gmail.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
Tom Mitchell <mitch@niftyegg.com> writes:
>I think it is important that US ITAR legislation had astounding and strict
>rules about cryptography as a munition. A system with the power of a
>Raspberry-Pi was under export restrictions. Recall early M68000 boxes were
>limited. Later any system that had two network NICs was restricted because
>of adaptive routing capabilities. One IPsec project at a largish TLA company
>was hobbled back to one engineer because the market was too small for the
>legal work required to deliver it.
The old COCOM restrictions were quaint anachronisms almost as soon as they
were issued. I remember going through the catalogue of a large PC dealership
and realising that at least 50% of their entire stock, if not more, was
export-controlled, due to things like using chips with 208+ pins, graphics
capabilities above the permitted minimum (an S3 Virge was too powerful to
export), and so on and so forth. Within a few years, 802.11 with its
DSSS/OFDM would have rendered anything with wireless capabilities
unexportable, and the presence of a basic Riva 128/3DFX Voodoo would have done
for the rest.
Peter.
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