[148906] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] nuclear arming codes
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Fairbrother)
Fri Jan 3 13:59:04 2014
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 03 Jan 2014 18:34:35 +0000
From: Peter Fairbrother <zenadsl6186@zen.co.uk>
To: Watson Ladd <watsonbladd@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CACsn0cmyoruzHA6zyWTf=zS+H0SpRniQyonA+MhpL+=ysdcwYw@mail.gmail.com>
Cc: Jerry Leichter <leichter@lrw.com>, Alan Braggins <alan.braggins@gmail.com>,
Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, John Gilmore <gnu@toad.com>,
Jonathan Thornburg <jthorn@astro.indiana.edu>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 03/01/14 16:57, Watson Ladd wrote:
> For the arms control treaties they use statistical methods AFAIK.
One technique I'm told is still in use is to affix glitter in random
patterns in clear epoxy to missile and/or warhead parts, then shine
lights on it from variable positions and compare the return sparkle
images to a known set for that patch. Very hard to forge.
Typically used to uniquely identify missile parts with a view to
counting them, with a friendly guy shining the lights in situ, in some
circumstances it can also be used with an enemy guy shining the lights
in a remote challenge-response fashion to ensure that the patch is still
intact - eg break the glass substrate which locks the core in its silo
and you break the patch.
-- Peter Fairbrother
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