[148993] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Dumb idea: open-source hardware USB key for
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Natanael)
Sat Jan 11 14:25:08 2014
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <CAD2Ti29XLZ1-v3jJqD3Y-ySimRGroV5yXrUNB3bF2ep6K53NOg@mail.gmail.com>
Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2014 11:06:08 +0100
From: Natanael <natanael.l@gmail.com>
To: grarpamp <grarpamp@gmail.com>
Cc: cpunks <cypherpunks@cpunks.org>,
Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
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Den 11 jan 2014 08:44 skrev "grarpamp" <grarpamp@gmail.com>:
>
> On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:53 PM, Bill Cox <waywardgeek@gmail.com> wrote:
> > I've been noodling the idea of a USB stick designed in a way that we
> > can trust the crypto that goes on there. It's a hard problem, but
> > there seems to be some guidelines that could help:
> >
> > - Open source hardware - schematics and everything including board
> > layout need to be free
> > - No ICs that could be compromised. Any CPU would have to be a
> > soft-core in an FPGA, with an open-source design
> > - FPGA configuration memory both readable and writable over a JTAG port
> > - External flash program memory also read/writeable through JTAG
> > - Reasonable hardware RNG where every node in the circuit can be probed
> > - Signal isolation from the PC: solid state relays would swap a simple
> > memory back and forth between the PC side and USB stick side. Maybe
> > power draw should be randomized to obscure any processing going on.
> > RF shielding should cover the USB stick. No other communication
> > should be possible. This is similar to an air gap.
> > - A community supported audit trail verifying produced USB keys are
secure
> >
> > The idea still has issues. Where would I be able to store secret keys
> > securely such that an attacker who stole my USB stick could not
> > recover it? Anyway, it's just a fun idea. I'd love to have such a
> > device in my pocket. There's a lot of applications I can think of
> > that could benefit from it, from electronic voting to
> > microtransactions. As one security expert once said in an
> > electronic-voting discussion I followed, no machine ever connected to
> > the Internet has proven secure. Could we make such a beast? I
> > probably don't really have time to work on it, but if a group were
> > building it, I'd participate.
>
> Many of these open hardware ideas come down to the fab level...
> can you examine (and trust) the fab process. Sure, publish all your
> schematics, VHDL, die masks, etc. But unless some number of
> random people can routinely make unannounced access-all-areas
> verification visits to the fab to verify those masks are the ones in use,
> it's moot. Or unless they can pull unannounced random samples
> and decap and analyse them, it's moot. That's why I've previously
> suggested people get together to making hardware RNG's out of
> discrete components... you don't have those worries then.
>
> I agree with the softcore loadable fpga and probe points ideas, they're
> good things. But in general, once you exceed a certain number of
> presupplied closed source and relatively unauditable gates [1], you
> should consider yourself potentially and generally fucked... and
> start taking a serious defense in depth approach.
>
> [1] Let's call it the number required to perform dumb leaks or take
> pseudo intelligent actions against you. The current lineup from
> Intel/AMD certainly fall in this category. As would quite a few
> lesser things... ARM, phones, cards, etc... firmware things.
> Does it not scare you that the next PC you're about to buy
> for your firewall is one of these systems, potentially hiding out
> to honor magic packets? Look at AMD's new CPU's coming
> out in a few weeks... besides gate count we all know about, it
> has embedded ARM cores. And just who is going to bring
> the aforesaid open model upon this class of gear? So it's
> +1 for spooks
What do you guys think of a device like this?
http://www.alansonsample.com/research/NFC-WISP-Eink.html
You could add capacitive touch, and then you have a very simple and cheap
device that can do basic crypto.
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<p dir=3D"ltr">Den 11 jan 2014 08:44 skrev "grarpamp" <<a href=
=3D"mailto:grarpamp@gmail.com">grarpamp@gmail.com</a>>:<br>
><br>
> On Fri, Jan 10, 2014 at 5:53 PM, Bill Cox <<a href=3D"mailto:waywar=
dgeek@gmail.com">waywardgeek@gmail.com</a>> wrote:<br>
> > I've been noodling the idea of a USB stick designed in a way =
that we<br>
> > can trust the crypto that goes on there. =C2=A0It's a hard pr=
oblem, but<br>
> > there seems to be some guidelines that could help:<br>
> ><br>
> > - Open source hardware - schematics and everything including boar=
d<br>
> > layout need to be free<br>
> > - No ICs that could be compromised. =C2=A0Any CPU would have to b=
e a<br>
> > soft-core in an FPGA, with an open-source design<br>
> > - FPGA configuration memory both readable and writable over a JTA=
G port<br>
> > - External flash program memory also read/writeable through JTAG<=
br>
> > - Reasonable hardware RNG where every node in the circuit can be =
probed<br>
> > - Signal isolation from the PC: solid state relays would swap a s=
imple<br>
> > memory back and forth between the PC side and USB stick side. =C2=
=A0Maybe<br>
> > power draw should be randomized to obscure any processing going o=
n.<br>
> > RF shielding should cover the USB stick. =C2=A0No other communica=
tion<br>
> > should be possible. =C2=A0This is similar to an air gap.<br>
> > - A community supported audit trail verifying produced USB keys a=
re secure<br>
> ><br>
> > The idea still has issues. =C2=A0Where would I be able to store s=
ecret keys<br>
> > securely such that an attacker who stole my USB stick could not<b=
r>
> > recover it? =C2=A0Anyway, it's just a fun idea. =C2=A0I'd=
love to have such a<br>
> > device in my pocket. =C2=A0There's a lot of applications I ca=
n think of<br>
> > that could benefit from it, from electronic voting to<br>
> > microtransactions. =C2=A0As one security expert once said in an<b=
r>
> > electronic-voting discussion I followed, no machine ever connecte=
d to<br>
> > the Internet has proven secure. =C2=A0Could we make such a beast?=
=C2=A0I<br>
> > probably don't really have time to work on it, but if a group=
were<br>
> > building it, I'd participate.<br>
><br>
> Many of these open hardware ideas come down to the fab level...<br>
> can you examine (and trust) the fab process. Sure, publish all your<br=
>
> schematics, VHDL, die masks, etc. But unless some number of<br>
> random people can routinely make unannounced access-all-areas<br>
> verification visits to the fab to verify those masks are the ones in u=
se,<br>
> it's moot. Or unless they can pull unannounced random samples<br>
> and decap and analyse them, it's moot. That's why I've pre=
viously<br>
> suggested people get together to making hardware RNG's out of<br>
> discrete components... you don't have those worries then.<br>
><br>
> I agree with the softcore loadable fpga and probe points ideas, they&#=
39;re<br>
> good things. But in general, once you exceed a certain number of<br>
> presupplied closed source and relatively unauditable gates [1], you<br=
>
> should consider yourself potentially and generally fucked... and<br>
> start taking a serious defense in depth approach.<br>
><br>
> [1] Let's call it the number required to perform dumb leaks or tak=
e<br>
> pseudo intelligent actions against you. The current lineup from<br>
> Intel/AMD certainly fall in this category. =C2=A0As would quite a few<=
br>
> lesser things... ARM, phones, cards, etc... firmware things.<br>
> Does it not scare you that the next PC you're about to buy<br>
> for your firewall is one of these systems, potentially hiding out<br>
> to honor magic packets? Look at AMD's new CPU's coming<br>
> out in a few weeks... besides gate count we all know about, it<br>
> has embedded ARM cores. And just who is going to bring<br>
> the aforesaid open model upon this class of gear? So it's<br>
> +1 for spooks</p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">What do you guys think of a device like this? </p>
<p dir=3D"ltr"><a href=3D"http://www.alansonsample.com/research/NFC-WISP-Ei=
nk.html">http://www.alansonsample.com/research/NFC-WISP-Eink.html</a></p>
<p dir=3D"ltr">You could add capacitive touch, and then you have a very sim=
ple and cheap device that can do basic crypto. <br>
</p>
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