[149099] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] Boing Boing pushing an RSA Conference boycott
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Tom Mitchell)
Sat Jan 18 00:46:59 2014
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <1389917899.22018.46.camel@excessive.dsl.static.sonic.net>
Date: Fri, 17 Jan 2014 14:03:50 -0800
From: Tom Mitchell <mitch@niftyegg.com>
To: Bear <bear@sonic.net>
Cc: Steve Furlong <demonfighter@gmail.com>,
Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>,
"cryptography@randombit.net" <cryptography@randombit.net>,
Kent Borg <kentborg@borg.org>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
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On Thursday, January 16, 2014, Bear <bear@sonic.net> wrote:
> On Wed, 2014-01-15 at 10:38 -0500, Steve Furlong wrote:
> > On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:15 AM, Kent Borg <kentborg@borg.org<javascript:;>>
> wrote:
> > > Huh? How can this be?
> > > one-time-pads themselves are compromised??
> >
> > Compromised PRNGs.
> >
>
> PRNG's have nothing to do with one-time pads. Compromised PRNG's
> affect stream ciphers, but one time pads do not use PRNG's.
>
> Bear
>
But it is possible to use any bit/ number generator to fill in a one time
pad (OTP).
I can imagine someone sharing a PRNG and seed so the far side of a
conversation could generate their copy of a digital OTP pad.
Subsiquent communication would "look" like a OTP conversation.
The advantage is transporting the digital pad is unnecessary.
The disadvantages are obvious.
Another bootstrap exchange might be a URL that reflects random bits from
the likes of lavarand and caches the bits against a web cookie now known to
two players. Thus shared entropy into a shared PRNG could bootstrap
communications that look like OTP communications. Cookie data is the
key.... in this case. Cascading JS sources muddy the traffic.
The challenge for listening is to discern PRNG-OTP from rand-noise-OTP
messages.
--
I be mobile, excuse my tipping!
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<br><br>On Thursday, January 16, 2014, Bear <<a href=3D"mailto:bear@soni=
c.net">bear@sonic.net</a>> wrote:<br><blockquote class=3D"gmail_quote" s=
tyle=3D"margin:0 0 0 .8ex;border-left:1px #ccc solid;padding-left:1ex">On W=
ed, 2014-01-15 at 10:38 -0500, Steve Furlong wrote:<br>
> On Wed, Jan 15, 2014 at 9:15 AM, Kent Borg <<a href=3D"javascript:;=
" onclick=3D"_e(event, 'cvml', 'kentborg@borg.org')">kentbo=
rg@borg.org</a>> wrote:<br>
> > Huh? =A0How can this be?<br>
> > one-time-pads themselves are compromised??<br>
><br>
> Compromised PRNGs.<br>
><br>
<br>
PRNG's have nothing to do with one-time pads. =A0Compromised PRNG's=
<br>
affect stream ciphers, but one time pads do not use PRNG's.<br>
<br>
Bear<br>
</blockquote><div><br></div><div>But it is possible to use any bit/=A0numbe=
r generator to fill in a one time pad (OTP).</div><div><br></div><div>=A0I =
can imagine someone sharing a PRNG and seed so the far side of a conversati=
on could generate their copy of=A0a digital OTP=A0pad. =A0=A0=A0 Subsiquent=
=A0communication would "look" like a OTP conversation. =A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>The advantage is transporting the digital pad is unnece=
ssary.=A0</div><div>The disadvantages are obvious. =A0</div><div><br></div>=
<div>Another bootstrap=A0exchange might be a URL that reflects random bits=
=A0from the likes of lavarand and caches the bits against a web cookie now =
known to two players. =A0Thus shared entropy into a shared=A0PRNG could boo=
tstrap communications that look like OTP communications. =A0 Cookie=A0data =
is the key.... in=A0this case. =A0 Cascading JS sources muddy the traffic. =
=A0</div>
<div><br></div><div>The challenge for listening=A0is to discern PRNG-OTP=A0=
from rand-noise-OTP messages. =A0=A0</div><div><br></div><div><br></div><di=
v><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><div><br></div><br><br>-- <br>I b=
e mobile, excuse my tipping!<br>
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