[149138] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] HSM's
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Todd)
Mon Jan 20 14:15:54 2014
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2014 13:19:22 -0500
From: Peter Todd <pete@petertodd.org>
To: ianG <iang@iang.org>
In-Reply-To: <52DD5227.6020303@iang.org>
Cc: Jerry Leichter <leichter@lrw.com>,
Thierry Moreau <thierry.moreau@connotech.com>,
cryptography@metzdowd.com, Bill Frantz <frantz@pwpconsult.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
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On Mon, Jan 20, 2014 at 07:43:19PM +0300, ianG wrote:
> At CAcert I more or less decided I could not trust the HSMs, as
> essentially they were unauditable. I don't see that has changed, and
> what I've heard of other CA practices is that they basically wing it in
> this direction. I guess some Auditors just nod off as soon as they hear
> that an approved (?) HSM is used without even checking the circumstances
> of the procurement and usage.
>=20
> So we stuck with the "home grown" HSM concept which was to build a
> machine, and lock it down in the secure rack. This has the risk that
> someone can sneak in and steal the root by opening it up. My call was
> that as the CA had covered pretty much all the other risk better, this
> was an acceptable risk. But in the future they should work to reduce
> this one as well.
And this is why we need n-of-m multiple key support in OpenPGP: I don't
really trust your home-grown HSM, or the professional one, but the
chance of both being backdoored is low.
--=20
'peter'[:-1]@petertodd.org
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