[149256] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] cheap sources of entropy
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Tue Jan 28 21:29:30 2014
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 12:23:38 +1000
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: Ben Laurie <ben@links.org>, =?UTF-8?B?S3Jpc3p0acOhbiBQaW50w6ly?=
<pinterkr@gmail.com>
In-Reply-To: <CAG5KPzxh41_GdXFtKStaPWqEYL0aMioedoYPN9pki5QU+rEivg@mail.gmail.com>
Cc: Cryptography Mailing List <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Reply-To: jamesd@echeque.com
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 2014-01-29 10:40, Ben Laurie wrote:
> Unfortunately, though, in low entropy systems it takes a _really_ long
> time to reach an uncompromised state in the first place.
I don't think there are any low entropy systems.
You don't need entropy in a hurry unless you are on the network. If on
the network, attacker cannot know everything about ever packet unless he
has physical access. Hard drive generates a lot of entropy, timing skew
generates a lot of entropy, and any physical sensor, such as camera or
microphone, generates lots of entropy.
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