[149268] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] cheap sources of entropy
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (dan@geer.org)
Wed Jan 29 23:33:30 2014
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: dan@geer.org
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: Your message of "Wed, 29 Jan 2014 15:30:06 PST."
<20140129235347.63160FC75@a-pb-sasl-quonix.pobox.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Jan 2014 23:11:55 -0500
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
It was said that:
> One well-calibrated well-defended well-monitored entropy source
> makes incomparably more sense than an arbitrarily complicated
> conglomeration of sucky sources.
Recalibrating first principles for a moment, please. My understanding
is that a mix of N bit streams will be truly unpredictable if any 1 of
the N bit streams is truly unpredictable.
If that is incorrect, what am I missing? (RTFM is entirely acceptable
and even gracious if accompanied by a pointer to TFM to R.)
--dan
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