[149302] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Cryptography] cheap sources of entropy
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Sun Feb 2 16:06:56 2014
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sun, 02 Feb 2014 22:29:09 +1000
From: "James A. Donald" <Jamesd@echeque.com>
To: Jerry Leichter <leichter@lrw.com>
In-Reply-To: <887284A4-62AE-48EA-9C2E-69E1B3032558@lrw.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com, Theodore Ts'o <tytso@mit.edu>,
Bill Stewart <bill.stewart@pobox.com>
Errors-To: cryptography-bounces+crypto.discuss=bloom-picayune.mit.edu@metzdowd.com
On 2014-02-02 21:40, Jerry Leichter wrote:
> There's no point in discussing this any further: Those who say "not so" would (a) have a great deal of difficulty proving a negative; (b) have little interest in (in our opinion) wasting our time looking for something that isn't there. So it's on you: If you feel such variations will survive - prove it!
The only thing that could eliminate such variations is a process switch
on a low frequency timer, rather than the availability of data. All the
other added complications, all the layers, all the virtualization, other
than switch on a low frequency time, will merely add more random
variation, rather than subtract existing variation
Now, if at any stage in the process, there was switching on a low
frequency time, it would show up, in that timing values on disk limited
processes would be exact multiples of that timer.
Which they are not.
> The techniques were published years ago, and are not particularly difficult or complex. A VM to which you have root access, and virtual disks of different apparent sizes and speeds, are readily available for minimal cost from Amazon, Google, Microsoft, and many others. Have at it!
>
> -- Jerry
>
>
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