[15025] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Amir Herzberg)
Tue Dec 23 13:40:03 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 23 Dec 2003 11:18:17 +0200
To: <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
From: Amir Herzberg <amir@herzberg.name>
In-Reply-To: <20031221162345.E6C46182F9E@red.metdow.com>
Ben, Carl and others,
At 18:23 21/12/2003, Carl Ellison wrote:
> > >and it included non-repudiation which is an unachievable,
> > nonsense concept.
Any alternative definition or concept to cover what protocol designers
usually refer to as non-repudiation specifications? For example
non-repudiation of origin, i.e. the ability of recipient to convince a
third party that a message was sent (to him) by a particular sender (at
certain time)?
Or - do you think this is not an important requirement?
Or what?
Best regards,
Amir Herzberg
Computer Science Department, Bar Ilan University
Lectures: http://www.cs.biu.ac.il/~herzbea/book.html
Homepage: http://amir.herzberg.name
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