[15044] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ed Gerck)
Sun Dec 28 11:59:57 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 24 Dec 2003 01:34:00 -0800
From: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Rcpt-To: <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Yes, the term "non-repudiation" has been badly misused in
old PKIX WG drafts (in spite of warnings by myself and
others) and some crypto works of reference -- usually
by well-intentioned but otherwise misguided people trying
to add "value" to digital certificates.
However, IMO non-repudiation refers to a useful and
essential cryptographic primitive. It does not mean the
affirmation of a truth (which is authentication). It means
the denial of a falsity -- such as:
(1) the ability to prevent the effective denial of an act (in
other words, denying the act becomes a falsity); or
(2) the ability to prevent the denial of the origin or delivery
of transactions.
Note that, except for a boolean system, the affirmation of
a truth is not the same as the denial of a falsity. Hence, the
usefulness of "non-repudiation" as a primitive. Take away
"non-repudiation" and you end up with a lesser "language"
with which to describe security processes.
Cheers,
Ed Gerck
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