[15059] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Ousourced Trust (was Re: Difference between TCPA-Hardware and a smart card and something else before
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Gutmann)
Sun Dec 28 12:18:23 2003
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sun, 28 Dec 2003 02:07:29 +1300
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: lynn@garlic.com, pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com, ereed@novell.com, iang@systemics.com
Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com> writes:
>the IETF OCSP standards work seems to be all about a real-time protocol that
>a relying party can use to check with a (LDAP?) database about whether the
>information that might be in a specific certificate can still be relied on.
>It has some of the flavor of a distributed filesystem/database cache entry
>invalidation protocol All of the CRL and OCSP stuff isn't about using the
>certificate for authenticating to an x.500 directory .... but whether the
>stale, static copy of information in the certificate is still good.
That's my big gripe with OCSP, it's compromised in almost every way in order
to make it completely bug-compatible with CRLs. It's really mostly an online
CRL query protocol rather than any kind of status protocol (in other words a
responder can give you an, uhh, "live" response from a week-old CRL via OCSP).
A recent update to the protocol even removes the use of nonces, to make replay
attacks possible.
Peter.
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