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Re: I don't know PAIN...

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ben Laurie)
Sun Dec 28 12:20:52 2003

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sat, 27 Dec 2003 16:01:35 +0000
From: Ben Laurie <ben@algroup.co.uk>
To: Raymond Lillard <ryl@mmcent.com>
Cc: crypto <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <3FE7B242.2010205@mmcent.com>

Raymond Lillard wrote:

> Ben Laurie wrote:
> 
>> Ian Grigg wrote:
>>
>>> What is the source of the acronym PAIN?
>>> Lynn said:
>>>
>>>> ... A security taxonomy, PAIN:
>>>> * privacy (aka thinks like encryption)
>>>> * authentication (origin)
>>>> * integrity (contents)
>>>> * non-repudiation
>>>
>>>
>>> I.e., its provenance?
>>>
>>> Google shows only a few hits, indicating
>>> it is not widespread.
>>
>>
>> Probably because non-repudiation is a stupid idea: 
>> http://www.apache-ssl.org/tech-legal.pdf.
> 
> 
> OK, I'm a mere country mouse when it comes to cryptography,
> so be kind.

:-)

> I have read most of the above paper on non-repudiation and
> noticed on p3 the following footnote:
> 
> "Note that there is no theoretical reason that it should be
> possible to figure out the public key given the private key,
> either, but it so happens that it is generally possible to
> do so"
> 
> So what's this "generally possible" business about?

Well, AFAIK its always possible, but I was hedging my bets :-) I can 
imagine a system where both public and private keys are generated from 
some other stuff which is then discarded.

> A few references will do.

If you want the gory details, I recommend the Handbook of Applied 
Cryptography by Menezes et al., _not_ the Schneier brick. Warning: 
pretty technical.

Cheers,

Ben.

-- 
http://www.apache-ssl.org/ben.html       http://www.thebunker.net/

"There is no limit to what a man can do or how far he can go if he
doesn't mind who gets the credit." - Robert Woodruff

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