[15132] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: why "penny black" etc. are not very useful (could crypto stop
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (john saylor)
Fri Jan 2 12:47:45 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 02 Jan 2004 12:10:46 -0500
From: john saylor <jsaylor@worldwinner.com>
To: Amir Herzberg <amir@herzberg.name>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <6.0.0.22.0.20040101092143.0257a5e0@getmail.amir.herzberg.name>
hi
Amir Herzberg wrote:
> E-mail (at least from new
> correspondents) must be signed by an `anti-spam mail certification
> authority (ASMCA)` - often the ISP of the sender. Recipient's mail
> client (or server) will reject mail (from new correspondents) not
> certified by a trustworthy ASMCA.
ok, but is it a 'web of trust' model [pgp] with many decentralized
ASMCAs [or whatever they're called], or a 'pay to play' model where an
authority [verisign] decides which mail gets the bits or not.
the technology exists, and would work. the problem [as is often the
case], comes with the human interface to the technology. i am very
skeptical of how much better things would be in a 'pay to play'
scenario. we'd just get different kinds of spam without lessening the flow.
> - ASMCA's have strong incentive not to approve spam.
if they can make more money by approving it, they will. i wish it were
otherwise.
--
\js ! VTABE NAPRV FFGER ATGU
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