[15176] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: [Fwd: Re: Non-repudiation (was RE: The PAIN mnemonic)]
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jerrold Leichter)
Fri Jan 9 10:24:13 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 7 Jan 2004 14:37:22 -0500 (EST)
From: Jerrold Leichter <jerrold.leichter@smarts.com>
To: Anton Stiglic <astiglic@okiok.com>
Cc: Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <006701c3d559$cf0d8040$7300a8c0@okiok.com>
| Non-repudiation applied to digital signatures implies that the definition
| states that only one person possibly had possession of the private signing
| key and was conscious about the fact that it was used to sign something.
There is absolutely *no* cryptographic or mathematical content to this
definition! It could as well apply to key locks, to signatures on paper,
or whatever. It's in no way a property of a cryptographic system, or of
*any* system. Nor, as written, is there even any possible set of evidence
that could be adduced to prove this: After all, someone might, just by
chance, have guessed the private key.
Granted, there are significant issues with non-repudiation - so significant
that it probably isn't a very useful concept. But it there *is* some
cryptographic content behind it! Otherwise, what are we to make, for example,
of the various "evolving signature key" schemes that detect stolen keys?
-- Jerry
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