[1526] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

home help back first fref pref prev next nref lref last post

Defense expert: crypto escrow endangers national security

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Mark Hedges)
Thu Sep 18 14:12:01 1997

Date: Thu, 18 Sep 1997 10:55:08 -0700 (PDT)
From: hedges@infonex.com (Mark Hedges)
To: cryptography@c2.net

18 Septmber, 1997

Greetings, concerned cryptographers,

Michael Wilson, the winner of the National Defense University's Sun Tzu
award, asserts that cryptographic key escrow would endanger national
security far more than it would help the fight against crime and
terrorism.  I interviewed him extensively.  His information warfare
thinktank, 7Pillars Partners, publishes their web pages and discussion
forums with Infonex Internet Inc.  A press release follows.

I haven't subscribed cryptography@c2.net to the press release mailing
list, but please ask if you would like to be on the list.

Sincerely,

Mark Hedges
VP Infonex Internet Inc.
hedges@infonex.com



P R E S S   R E L E A S E

INFONEX AND 7PILLARS

9/18/97

For Immediate Release
Contact:        Mark Hedges             Infonex Internet Inc.
                (619) 667-7969 (ph)     Anonymizer Inc.
                (619) 667-7966 (fx)     8415 La Mesa Blvd. Ste. 3
                hedges@infonex.com      La Mesa, CA  91941

                Michael Wilson          7Pillars Partners
                5514706@mcimail.com     www.7pillars.com


DEFENSE EXPERT ASSERTS: KEY ESCROW ENDANGERS NATIONAL SECURITY


Michael Wilson has over fifteen years experience in information and

infrastructure warfare as a field operations professional, and recently

won the National Defense University Sun Tzu Award for his work.  He

agrees that mandatory cryptographic key escrow and key recovery endanger

national security.  Individual and private maintenance of strong

cryptographic systems, he claims, are essential to the protection of the

United States' government and people.



"Escrow and government involvement," says Wilson, "are antithetical

positions to safety, security, and, incidentally, reliability and

serviceability [of cryptographic systems].  How many billions of dollars

are lost per year to industrial espionage because the data that gets

moved around isn't secure? How much downtime from viral or hacker attack

could be prevented by using cryptography in building real defensive

systems?



"As far as I can see, the real criminals are those supporting escrow, or

blocking cryptography's use by the market -- they are allowing a

situation to persist that perpetuates the risk.  Escrow negates the

strength of ciphersystems.  Back doors will be discovered and will work

against everyone."



With distributed, independent maintenance of cryptography, the whole

body of information in the U.S. is much more secure.  Wilson has studied

the subject extensively, and his work is used in training top military

intelligence officers.  "Escrow only shifts the points of attack, and in

fact, once you've subverted escrow, you have the keys to the candystore.

This is like the Ames case in the U.S. -- by subverting the counter-

intelligence arm of the CIA, the Soviets/Russians were able to run their

own operations without worry, and able to close down any real threats.

It took a great many years to catch Ames, long after the major damage

was done, and long after it was even suspected that there was a mole in

the Agency.



"What makes anyone think the escrow agency will be any more secure?

After all, if the NSA were doing its job in the first place (in their

charter they are also given the responsibility of protecting U.S.

security and integrity with technology), this wouldn't be an issue.  But

the job isn't possible; solutions to security issues aren't going to

come from the government, but from the free market."



The law enforcement agencies and intelligence community say that

unregulated cryptography will aid criminals.  Says Wilson, criminals

"already have cryptography in place.  What needs protecting is everyone

else, and cryptography is the best way to secure the systems." With

mandated key escrow or key recovery, he says, the government assumes

"somehow the terrorist isn't going to have any tradecraft, and so will

use the escrow, from a stable, known phone, to discuss plans, and not in

code...as for what escrow supposedly 'buys' you, well, it reminds me of

a comment about the law.  You shouldn't make a law because of a small

number or even an isolated case -- yet escrow is intended to 'fix' a

very small number of problems by creating an even larger set of

problems.  Given a small set of problems, it creates an inelegant

solution, and then mandates that as the only solution."



An increasing information warfare threat, posits Wilson in his paper

"Waging IWAR", is viral attack of computer systems through use of active

and dynamic software.  In the paper, he says "cryptography will soon be

an essential tool" to combat viral and other computer infiltration

attacks.  Using cryptography, Wilson designed a computer hardware and

operating system which was 100% resistant to over 200 known computer

viruses, and some which he programmed himself for the test.  Such a

system is currently unmarketable, he says, because cryptography is

treated as munitions by the intelligence agencies.  "The criminal

conduct of the intelligence and law enforcement community in their

persistent attempts to control cryptography mean that it can't be well

integrated into systems as a basic enabling technology."



Infonex is a firm which provides security, privacy, anonymity and free

speech tools to the world-wide Internet community.  7Pillars is a

private defense thinktank specializing in information, infrastructure,

conventional and political warfare.  7Pillars publishes their web

pages and public forums with Infonex.  To subscribe to the IWAR mailing

list, send e-mail to iwar-request@infonex.com with the word "subscribe"

in the body of the message.  See the 7Pillars web pages at

www.7pillars.com for essays and other information.



home help back first fref pref prev next nref lref last post