[15262] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Ian Grigg)
Wed Apr 7 16:24:37 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 07 Apr 2004 15:42:47 -0400
From: Ian Grigg <iang@systemics.com>
To: "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>
Cc: "'Major Variola (ret)'" <mv@cdc.gov>, cryptography@metzdowd.com,
cypherpunks@al-qaeda.net
In-Reply-To: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A064A78E6@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
Trei, Peter wrote:
> Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
> unneccesary complication.
It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particular
way.") or other incentives-based attacks.
You can have one, or the other, but not both, right?
It would seem that the former must give way to the latter,
at least in political voting. I.e., no verification after
the vote.
iang
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