[15264] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Michael_Heyman@NAI.com)
Wed Apr 7 16:26:31 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 7 Apr 2004 16:14:59 -0400
From: <Michael_Heyman@NAI.com>
To: <cryptography@metzdowd.com>, <cypherpunks@al-qaeda.net>
> From: owner-cryptography@metzdowd.com=20
> [mailto:owner-cryptography@metzdowd.com] On Behalf Of Trei, Peter
> Sent: Wednesday, April 07, 2004 1:17 PM
> [SNIP]=20
>=20
> Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an=20
> unnecessary complication.
>
Except to those of us who don't trust the system.
Implemented correctly it could be cheap and complications could be
hidden from the voter. It could be cheaper - no need to pay people to do
an audit when "the people" will do it for you. You only need a small
fraction of "the people" to verify their votes to get a high level of
confidence that the election is valid. You only need one failure to cast
doubt on the election. This requires an un-forgeable receipt that cannot
be used for coercion. Un-forgeable we have been doing for a while now
with lots of different PK options. A receipt that cannot be used for
coercion cannot give any indication to others of who you voted for.
Right now this is a big complication (at least to me - I don't know how
to create such a receipt that doesn't require mental gymnastics on the
part of the voter).
-Michael Heyman
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