[15272] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Firm invites experts to punch holes in ballot software
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Brian McGroarty)
Fri Apr 9 11:09:50 2004
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Thu, 8 Apr 2004 08:42:04 -0500
To: Ian Grigg <iang@systemics.com>
Cc: "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>,
"'Major Variola (ret)'" <mv@cdc.gov>, cryptography@metzdowd.com,
cypherpunks@al-qaeda.net
In-Reply-To: <407459B7.2030609@systemics.com>
From: Brian McGroarty <brian@mcgroarty.net>
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On Wed, Apr 07, 2004 at 03:42:47PM -0400, Ian Grigg wrote:
> Trei, Peter wrote:
> >Frankly, the whole online-verification step seems like an
> >unneccesary complication.
>=20
> It seems to me that the requirement for after-the-vote
> verification ("to prove your vote was counted") clashes
> rather directly with the requirement to protect voters
> from coercion ("I can't prove I voted in a particular
> way.") or other incentives-based attacks.
>=20
> You can have one, or the other, but not both, right?
Suppose individual ballots weren't usable to verify a vote, but
instead confirming data was distributed across 2-3 future ballot
receipts such that all of them were needed to reconstruct another
ballot's vote.
It would then be possible to verify an election with reasonable
confidence if a large number of ballot receipts were collected, but
individual ballot receipts would be worthless.
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