[15320] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

home help back first fref pref prev next nref lref last post

Re: voting

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Yeoh Yiu)
Mon Apr 19 14:48:19 2004

X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
To: Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com>
Cc: David Jablon <dpj@theworld.com>,
	John Kelsey <kelsey.j@ix.netcom.com>,
	"Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>, cypherpunks@al-qaeda.net,
	cryptography@metzdowd.com,
	"'privacy.at Anonymous Remailer'" <mixmaster@remailer.privacy.at>
From: Yeoh Yiu <squid@panix.com>
Date: 18 Apr 2004 23:12:24 -0400
In-Reply-To: <4080296D.18F94552@nma.com>

Ed Gerck <egerck@nma.com> writes:

> David Jablon wrote:
> > 

> The 'second law' also takes precedence: ballots are always secret, only
> vote totals are known and are known only after the election ends.
> 
> > What I see in serious
> > voting system research efforts are attempts to build systems that
> > provide both accountability and privacy, with minimal tradeoffs.
> 
> There is no tradeoff prossible for voter privacy and ballot secrecy.
> Take away one of them and the voting process is no longer a valid
> measure. Serious voting system research efforts do not begin by
> denying the requirements.

You get totals per nation, per state, per county, per riding,
per precinct, per polling stion and maybe per ballot box.
So there's a need to design the system to have more voters
than ballot boxes to conform to your second law.

---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com

home help back first fref pref prev next nref lref last post