[16817] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Dell to Add Security Chip to PCs
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Dan Kaminsky)
Sat Feb 5 13:23:59 2005
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 04 Feb 2005 13:20:50 -0500
From: Dan Kaminsky <dan@doxpara.com>
To: "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>
Cc: Erwann ABALEA <erwann@abalea.com>,
Tyler Durden <camera_lumina@hotmail.com>, rah@shipwright.com,
cryptography@metzdowd.com, cypherpunks@al-qaeda.net
In-Reply-To: <017630AA6DF2DF4EBC1DD4454F8EE29704776C5F@rsana-ex-hq1.NA.RSA.NET>
>The best that can happen with TCPA is pretty good -
>it could stop a lot of viruses and malware, for one
>thing.
>
>
>
No, it can't. That's the point; it's not like the code running inside
the sandbox becomes magically exploitproof...it just becomes totally
opaque to any external auditor. A black hat takes an exploit, encrypts
it to the public key exported by the TCPA-compliant environment (think
about a worm that encrypts itself to each cached public key) and sends
the newly unauditable structure out. Sure, the worm can only manipulate
data inside the sandbox, but when the whole *idea* is to put everything
valuable inside these safe sandboxes, that's not exactly comforting.
--Dan
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