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Re: Linux RNG paper

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Victor Duchovni)
Wed Mar 22 21:45:29 2006

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Date: Wed, 22 Mar 2006 21:04:54 -0500
From: Victor Duchovni <Victor.Duchovni@MorganStanley.com>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
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In-Reply-To: <r02010500-1039-A073AC2CB9F311DAA6940030658F0F64@[192.168.1.5]>

On Wed, Mar 22, 2006 at 02:31:37PM -0800, Bill Frantz wrote:

> One of my pet peeves: The idea that the "user" is the proper atom of
> protection in an OS.
> 
> My threat model includes different programs run by one (human) user.  If
> a Trojan, running as part of my userID, can learn something about the
> random numbers harvested by my browser/gpg/ssh etc., then it can start
> to attack the keys used by those applications, even if the OS does a
> good job of keeping the memory spaces separate and protected.
> 

Why would a trojan running in your security context bother with attacking
a PRNG? It can just read your files, record your keystrokes, change your
browser proxy settings, ...

If the trojan is a sand-box of some sort, the sand-box is a different
security context, and in that case, perhaps a different RNG view is
justified.

Some applications that consume a steady stream of RNG data, maintain
their own random pool, and use the public pool to periodically mix in
some fresh state. These are less vulnerable to snooping/exhaustion of
the public stream.

The Postfix tlsmgr(8) process proxies randomness for the rest of the
system in this fashion...

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