[2302] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: reference
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Mike Rosing)
Fri Mar 20 12:33:24 1998
Date: Thu, 19 Mar 1998 23:00:02 -0600 (CST)
From: Mike Rosing <cryptech@Mcs.Net>
Reply-To: Mike Rosing <cryptech@Mcs.Net>
To: Robert Hettinga <rah@shipwright.com>
cc: dcsb@ai.mit.edu, cryptography@c2.net, CYBERIA-L@LISTSERV.AOL.COM
In-Reply-To: <v04003a36b136e6994efd@[139.167.130.246]>
On Thu, 19 Mar 1998, Robert Hettinga wrote:
> At 10:07 PM -0500 on 3/18/98, Somebody, a law professor Somewhere, wrote:
>
>
> > ...Do you know the place to find the rule,law,whatever
> > which waives certain encryption export restriction rules for large US corps
> > that need extra security???
>
>
> In the vain hope that I'm wrong on this, :-), I'll bounce this to
> dcsb@ai.mit.edu, cryptography@c2.net, CYBERIA-L@LISTSERV.AOL.COM,
> e$@vmeng.com, and DIGSIG@LISTSERV.TEMPLE.EDU to see if anyone in those
> places knows of a particular actual *law* on the books, other than the
> ITARs (not a law), now the EARs (also not a law), about financial
> cryptography. As far as "rules" go, there are the various interpretations
> of ITARs, oops, EARs, of course, which are, as I said, more conspicuous by
> what they *don't* do, than what they, heh, do do, for US companies who hope
> to export even just financial cryptography.
>
Check this out:
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/encreg.htm
It's long and boring and covers the topic. I think it's the law, but I
ain't a lawyer.
Cryptography is a weapon. With a wire wrap tool, you too can create
weapons of mass destruction using nothing but untracable legal parts.
Patience, persistence, truth,
Dr. mike
