[23176] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
fyi: Deniable File System - Rubberhose
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com)
Wed Apr 19 13:14:42 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: Jeff.Hodges@KingsMountain.com
Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 09:20:42 -0700
From: Owen Blacker <owen@blacker.me.uk>
Subject: Deniable File System
To: UK Crypto list <ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk>
Date: Wed, 19 Apr 2006 11:43:18 +0100 (BST)
Reply-To: ukcrypto@chiark.greenend.org.uk
http://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2006/04/deniable_file_s.html
Some years ago I did some design work on something I called a Deniable
File System. The basic idea was the fact that the existence of
ciphertext can in itself be incriminating, regardless of whether or not
anyone can decrypt it. I wanted to create a file system that was
deniable: where encrypted files looked like random noise, and where it
was impossible to prove either the existence or non-existence of
encrypted files.
This turns out to be a very hard problem for a whole lot of reasons, and
I never pursued the project. But I just discovered a file system that
seems to meet all of my design criteria -- Rubberhose
<http://iq.org/~proff/rubberhose.org/> :
Rubberhose transparently and deniably encrypts disk data, minimising
the effectiveness of warrants, coersive interrogations and other
compulsive mechanims, such as U.K RIP legislation. Rubberhose differs
from conventional disk encryption systems in that it has an advanced
modular architecture, self-test suite, is more secure, portable,
utilises information hiding (steganography / deniable cryptography),
works with any file system and has source freely available.
The devil really is in the details with something like this, and I would
hesitate to use this in places where it really matters without some
extensive review. But I'm pleased to see that someone is working on this
problem.
Next request: A deniable file system that fits on a USB token, and
leaves no trace on the machine it's plugged into.
- --
Owen Blacker, London GB
Say no to ID cards: www.no2id.net
- --
They that can give up essential liberty to obtain a little temporary
safety deserve neither liberty nor safety --Benjamin Franklin, 1759
----------
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
