[2326] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Rivest's Wheat & Chaff - A crypto alternative
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Nathan Spande)
Mon Mar 23 16:00:40 1998
From: Nathan Spande <nathan@epicsys.com>
To: cryptography@c2.net
Date: Mon, 23 Mar 1998 14:11:48 -0600
> Marc Horowitz writes:
> > Ron's chaffing technique is technically interesting, but I don't
> think
> > it's the Answer. What is to prevent the BXA from declaring that
> > chaffing software is an EI, and therefore export controlled?
>
> Nothing.
>
> I agree with you that the problem is the desire of the FBI and NSA to
> read all message traffic, even if implementing that desire REDUCES
> national security and the ability of ordinary citizens to avoid being
> victims of crime. (The cost of not universally deploying crypto is
> measured in the billions, but presumably that is nothing compared to
> the desire of folks at NSA and the FBI to maintain the status quo and
> (presumably) their jobs.)
>
Ok, this brings up an interesting point for me. We as a
community have, in the past, attacked the FBI for their arguments about
the importance of wiretaps in the effective prosecution (and prevention)
of crimes. I often see us saying that strong cryptography will actually
reduce the number and severity of crimes, but I've never seen anybody
support such a statement. What percentage of crime involves failures of
authentication and/or disclosure by non-priviledged individuals of
confidential information?
And come on, you can't actually believe that FBI and NSA are
concerned about crypto because they feel it threatens their jobs. The
very arguments we use to support the release of strong crypto, that it
does more good than harm, shows that their agencies are going to be just
fine. We argue that wiretaps don't do the FBI any good, which implies
that strong crypto won't affect them. Except in the reduction of the
number of crimes, and they already have more than they can handle. To
any FBI and NSA folks out there, if this is indeed a motivation for you,
I wouldn't worry about it.
> So long as the government feels it knows better than the citizens (and
>
> you thought you lived in a democracy!) and insists on stopping us from
>
> being able to talk privately, no technology that prevents
> eavesdropping, be it encryption, "chaffing", or anything else, will be
>
> safe from attempts at bans. The INTENT of the laws is the problem, not
>
> the laws themselves. The intent, of course, is to leave people
> defenseless against eavesdropping.
>
> The fact that the widespread deployment of cryptographic technologies
> would be a potent tool against crime is immaterial to the FBI and
> NSA. They are not stupid people, so we must presume that their goal is
> not to try to defend the U.S. public, so much as it is to preserve and
>
> protect their own departments.
>
Exactly, they aren't stupid people. I also think they aren't
evil people. They may not be right, but I think that they honestly
believe in their positions.
Nathan
