[23982] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: PGP "master keys"
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Derek Atkins)
Thu Apr 27 10:39:06 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2006 22:24:22 -0400
From: Derek Atkins <warlord@MIT.EDU>
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <20060426215327.eaccc9e8.smb@cs.columbia.edu>
Quoting "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>:
> In an article on disk encryption
> (http://www.theregister.co.uk/2006/04/26/pgp_infosec/), the following
> paragraph appears:
>
> BitLocker has landed Redmond in some hot water over its insistence
> that there are no back doors for law enforcement. As its
> encryption code is open source, PGP says it can guarantee no back
> doors, but that cyber sleuths can use its master keys if
> neccessary.
>
> What is a "master key" in this context?
ADK, the Additional Decryption Key. An enterprise with a Managed
PGP Desktop installed base can set up an ADK and all messages get
encrypted to the ADK in addition to the recipient's key.
> --Steven M. Bellovin, http://www.cs.columbia.edu/~smb
-derek
--
Derek Atkins, SB '93 MIT EE, SM '95 MIT Media Laboratory
Member, MIT Student Information Processing Board (SIPB)
URL: http://web.mit.edu/warlord/ PP-ASEL-IA N1NWH
warlord@MIT.EDU PGP key available
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