[2413] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Foreign Espionage Protection Act (was Re: Rivest's Wheat & Chaff
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Arnold G. Reinhold)
Tue Mar 31 08:58:46 1998
In-Reply-To: <19980330172642.13488@die.com>
Date: Tue, 31 Mar 1998 01:50:39 -0500
To: die@die.com, cryptography@c2.net
From: "Arnold G. Reinhold" <reinhold@world.std.com>
At 5:26 PM -0500 3/30/98, Dave Emery wrote:
>>
>> The law enforcement industry couldn't care less whether the cellphone
>> airlinks are private. All wiretaps are done at the base station or
>> inside the network, where no scanners are needed.
>>
> Sadly, this is only true of *legal* wiretaps by authorized *US*
>entities. Ask any of the dealers and manufacturers of cellphone
>interception gear and high end scanners who buys this stuff (with cell
>phone band enabled). Lots of LEA types have this gear, some of which
>is specialized enough so it could have no other purpose.
>
The *US* deserves more emphasis. I expect every foreign embassy, consul or
other diplomatic office is equipped with cell phone scanning gear, brought
in to the U.S. via diplomatic pouch. Washington DC and New York City are
especially vulnerable. With the U.N. in New York, even countries with whom
we do not have diplomatic relations get a steady flow of valuable political
and economic intelligence, not to mention blackmail material that can yield
still more data and influence. Russia and other space-capable nations
presumably gather cell calls en masse from orbit.
By keeping the public from demanding meaningful cell phone encryption,
anti-scanning laws ensure that this flow of intelligence to our adversaries
(and friends) is uninterrupted. Perhaps we should hand out little stickers
to our Congress people that say "Warning: Conversations on this cell phone
are monitored by Foreign Agents." HR2369 should be renamed: "The
Hear-No-Evil, See-No-Evil Foreign Espionage Protection Act of 1998."
Arnold Reinhold
Got crypto? http://ciphersaber.gurus.com
