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Re: Linux RNG paper

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (markus reichelt)
Thu May 4 21:48:16 2006

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Date: Thu, 04 May 2006 20:26:32 +0200
From: markus reichelt <ml@mareichelt.de>
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* Jason Holt <jason@lunkwill.org> wrote:

> >On Thu, 04 May 2006 18:14:09 +0200, markus reichelt <ml@mareichelt.de>
> >wrote:
> >>Agreed; but regarding unix systems, I know of none crypto
> >>implementation that does integrity checking. Not just de/encrypt the
> >>data, but verify that the encrypted data has not been tampered with.
>=20
> There's also ecryptfs:
>=20
> http://ecryptfs.sourceforge.net/

Thanks to you both; and good to see that ecryptfs is actively
maintained. I might check it out myself but I'll definitely link it.

I'm interested as well in watermark/dictionary attacks (like on
mainline cryptoloop) on ecryptfs. Something like mentioned here,
http://mail.nl.linux.org/linux-crypto/2005-11/msg00016.html

Users of ecrypt are also encouraged to share their views on
stability/reliability of ecryptfs.

--=20
left blank, right bald

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