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Re: TIME Magazine on GSM cell phone crack

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Greg Rose)
Wed Apr 15 19:24:33 1998

To: David Wagner <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>
cc: cryptech@Mcs.Net, cryptography@c2.net
In-reply-to: Your message of Tue, 14 Apr 1998 18:22:46 MST.
             <199804150122.SAA02021@joseph.cs.berkeley.edu> 
Date: Thu, 16 Apr 1998 08:49:35 +1000
From: Greg Rose <ggr@qualcomm.com>

David Wagner writes:
>As for Mike Rosing's remarks, I suspect he may be thinking of the
>US analog networks (and, to some extent, the digital North American
>systems).  For instance, GSM phones don't have any concept of MIN/ESN
>pairs; so far as I know, that's a North American idiosyncracy.

GSM phones do have an ESN (Elecronic Serial
Number). It is an FCC regulation that this be
transmitted clear at some point during a call.
However, in the GSM system, the ESN is not
included in any way in the authentication... in
the IS-41 (North American) systems it is part of
the authentication signature calculation. IS-41
systems seem to be migrating away from this for
future versions though; there was never a
particularly good reason for including it, and
moving SIMs (or equivalent) between phones is
tough with it in there.

>And all those fraud detection expert systems are primarily deployed
>(as far as I can tell) in North American analog networks, where there's
>absolutely no crypto, and fraud is already a massive problem, to the
>tune of > $500 million / year.

Actually, the CTIA reports that it peaked in 1996,
and is now declining in percentage terms. This
information is supposedly on a web page
http://www.wow-com.com which they run, but it is
too java-ish for my liking so I haven't checked it
myself.

Greg.

Greg Rose                                     INTERNET: ggr@qualcomm.com
QUALCOMM Australia        VOICE:  +61-2-9181 4851   FAX: +61-2-9181 5470
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