[25599] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Piercing network anonymity in real time
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (StealthMonger)
Sun May 14 20:25:43 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: 15 May 2006 00:20:15 -0000
From: StealthMonger <StealthMonger@nym.alias.net>
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Ivan Krstic <krstic@fas.harvard.edu> writes:
> Calling this "piercing network anonymity in real time" is highly
> misleading; in reality, it's more like "making it bloody obvious
> that there's no such thing as network anonymity".
No. Ever hear of Chaum's "Dining Cryptographers" [1]? Anonymity
right there at the table. Been around for almost twenty years.
Strong anonymity is available today using chains of random-latency,
mixing, anonymizing remailers based on mixmaster [2], of which there
is a thriving worldwide network [3].
> The best one can hope for today is a bit of anonymous browsing and
> IM with Tor ...
Tor is indicted by its own documentation:
... for low-latency systems like Tor, end-to-end traffic
correlation attacks [8, 21, 31] allow an attacker who can observe
both ends of a communication to correlate packet timing and volume,
quickly linking the initiator to her destination. [4]
[1] "The Dining Cryptographers Problem: Unconditional Sender
Untraceability," D. Chaum, (invited) Journal of Cryptology, vol. 1
no. 1, 1988, pp. 65-75.
ftp://ftp.csua.berkeley.edu/pub/cypherpunks/papers/chaum.dining.cryptographers.gz
http://www.e-ztown.com/cryptopapers.htm
http://citeseer.nj.nec.com/context/143887/0
[2] http://sourceforge.net/projects/mixmaster/.
[3] See usenet newsgroup alt.privacy.anon-server.
[4] http://tor.eff.org/cvs/tor/doc/design-paper/challenges.pdf
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
