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Date: Thu, 21 May 1998 12:51:09 -0700 From: koontz@netapp.com (David Koontz) To: cryptography@c2.net, erehwon@dis.org >The LORAL source, who worked at LORAL's satellite manufacturing facility >when the Chinese launches began, continues: "I spoke to one of our >engineers about a year after the explosion, he is like many at LORAL, >retired military officers from the black programs of our military. His >assumption was that the Chinese kept the encryption IC board with the intent >of reverse engineering its function and that espionage was China's intent." The largest vendor of satellite encryption technology is MYKOTRONX (notorious for key escrow). Going through Rainbow's web page you find they manufacture a variety of systems, including classified stuff used in military satellites. I find it hard to believe that a commercial satellite carries classified crypto (other than for black purposes). Commerical satellite crypto for sensitive applications can be required to have escrowed crypto. One would think that a satellite is guaranteed to be uniquely keyed. In the good old days, you would always see someone reprogramming permuter trays for ground satellite gear, the assumption they were switching satellite download feeds. There shouldn't be any particular value in obtaining a single satellites crypto module. Modern satellite crypto has the capability of being remotely rekeyed. I would imagine they are capable of detecting spoofing attempts by issuing responses to ground stations for failed commands. Older military crypto was shift register based. It might well be more susceptible to cryptographic analysis than modern systems, although I can tell you the shift register length for the satellite stuff is quite long. While I'm sure there are vehicles still in orbit carrying old military crypto, block-cipher based systems are guaranteed to have been used at least since the advent of GPS. block-ciphers mix key and data quite thoroughly, reducing the value of knowing the algorithm. Assuming one where to want to exploit a recovered crypto module, knowledge of the structure and protocols of a targetted vehicle are required. I'd be inclined to believe the Chinese might keep it for intelligence purposes, but won't gain much for their efforts. Military satellite crypto used to be built into lead bricks. Where did the debris fall? (Any lakes near by?)
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