[2751] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive

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Re: Secure Office

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Mok-Kong Shen)
Tue May 26 10:57:26 1998

Date: Mon, 25 May 1998 10:06:08 +0100
From: Mok-Kong Shen <mok-kong.shen@stud.uni-muenchen.de>
To: cryptography@c2.net

Derek Atkins wrote:

> As for factoring attacks, well, you might as well brute-force the IDEA
> keys in use too -- it's about as difficult!  I don't see this as a
> valid excuse for not publishing your public key.  The only excuse I
> _can_ see is the same reason to have an unpublished phone number --
> you don't want random unknowns to send you random encrypted messages.
> Yeah traffic analysis.

If a public key serves for messages from only a limited circle of
correspondents then there is no reason why it should be widely known.
In general there is the principle of limiting knowledge in any
field to those who have a 'need to know' in order to enhance security. 
Anything, however minute, that adds to the workload of the analyst 
can be of value.

M. K. Shen

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