[2763] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: DRUDGE-REPORT-EXCLUSIVE 5/20/98 (fwd)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Black Unicorn)
Wed May 27 18:00:35 1998
Date: Wed, 27 May 1998 16:28:02 -0500
To: Tom Perrine <tep@SDSC.EDU>
From: Black Unicorn <unicorn@schloss.li>
Cc: reinhold@world.std.com, erehwon@dis.org, cryptography@c2.net
In-Reply-To: <199805272123.OAA08094@galt>
At 04:23 PM 5/27/98 , Tom Perrine wrote:
>>>>>> The moving finger of Black Unicorn, having written:
>
> Black> At 01:47 PM 5/27/98 , Arnold G. Reinhold wrote:
>
> <SNIP>
>
> Black> Sure they do. The satellite has to sit on the ground in China
a good long
> Black> time before it goes up. Using non-hardware/tamper resistant based
> Black> encryption is a rather silly thing to do.
>
>The crypto components are under US physical control at all times.
>This is one of the last things placed on the booster, as late as
>possible, by US personnel. See "Aviation Week and Space News"
>coverage over the past year or so.
There's physical control, and there's physical control. You never, never,
depend solely on physical control. There's also "US physical control" and
"US physical control." By the way, "a good long time" is a very short time
in terms of days when you're talking about crypto.
> Black> I might add that a recent DoD project involved introducing
virii to radar
> Black> systems via EMI. Depending on the state of research in this
field and
> Black> given the sensitivity of satellite traffic, the expense
invested, and the
> Black> hostile environment, using non-hardened or software based
crypto might be a
> Black> very poor idea.
>
>I'd sure like to see a reference on this.
Attend InfoWarCon. It's hardly super-secret stuff.
