[2831] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: NSA Declassifies Algos -Reply
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Kawika Daguio)
Wed Jun 24 11:44:27 1998
Date: Wed, 24 Jun 1998 10:59:00 -0400
From: "Kawika Daguio" <Kdaguio@aba.com>
To: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz
Cc: cryptography@c2.net
Releasing these algos was a smart and sound move on the NSA's part.
I have spent way too much time over the last 5 years trying to get the NSA =
to be more open than they have been and to take more risks to support =
their protection mission. They are doing a tremendous job compared to a =
few years ago and we have welcomed their actions which acknowledge that =
protection is becoming as important as exploitation. This move gives me =
hope that this trend will continue if not accelerate.
The NSA has worked with the banking industry for over 20 years to guide =
the industry away from a number of potentially problematic infosecurity =
approaches thus helping vendors to meet the banking industry assurance =
requirements as well as guidance to help limit implementation problems. =
Their most important contributions have come in the area of development of =
security standards in ANSI X9F committees. While we have had disagreements=
in the past that led to the enactment of the Computer Security Act, and =
other fallout, there is a growing, but still limited trust between our two =
worlds. I would expect that those that examine the algorithms will find =
they have practical application and non-conspiracy theorists will find =
comfort in their provenance rather than a threat.
We have hoped that the NSA would be more active, visible, and open about =
the algorithms in their vaults and those the private sector develops. =
Unfortunately, however, any public activity on their part usually brings =
immediate and overwhelming negative public relations consequences =
regardless of the nature of their initiative. As a result even when the =
wish to help industry more they are reluctant to actually face the risks =
involved. To my regret, because of the Clipper and KR debate related =
public relations damage, the Agency has been unwilling to contribute an =
algorithm to the AES beauty contest despite my requests that they do so in =
the interest of advancing national security. =20
We rejected using SJ/KEA and fortezza cards for a PKI almost 4 years ago =
when the government offered them to us even in a built in a way that would =
have separated us from the government KE/KR infrastructure. Among the =
original 5 public reviewers of these algorithms are a couple from our =
community, and we were also offered an opportunity to review the algorithms=
on an indepth basis. =20
The banking industry wants more good choices and our sector believes that =
alot can be learned from an "allied" group that hammers on crypto on an =
unparalleled basis in a production oriented environment. Brilliant =
academics and entrepreneurial technologists have great potential and have =
contributed much, but nothing beats money, manpower, and experience. =
Transferring some of the fruits of this experience is a recommendation =
that I made while on a PCCIP (critical infrastructure) R&D committee =
appointment.
I hope that they share more of the fruits of their past efforts on terms =
negotiated with N and industry. I believe that it is entirely appropriate=
that they have declassified these algorithms and they should continue =
along this line by being more visibly active in the AES evaluations now =
that the time for submissions has passed. Also, given the expected =
adoption of the ECDSA by a number of critical infrastructure sectors, it =
is thus reasonable to expect that a significant level or resources be =
expended to insure that no surprises arise after it is made a standard, =
and implemented widely.
We have repeatedly argued that equivalent resources be allocated early in =
the standards process to the algorithms that industry is pursuing as if an =
actively hostile nation were using it. We would expect that information =
be shared and guidance be forthcoming to ensure that a "known" problem in =
the secret world be shared with those operating or supplying technology =
solutions to critical infrastructure sectors.
Transferring these algorithms is a great start, but continued openness and =
advancement of mutual interests requires the NSA and the private sector to =
be open and take risks and extend some measure of trust beyond their own =
domains. I hope it happens, if it does I am confident we will all =
benefit.
the above represent my views and not to be considered the views of the =
american bankers association or the financial institutions we represent =
unless otherwise indicated.
kawika daguio
