[289] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: GAK in domestic crypto products
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (jim bell)
Sun Feb 23 15:36:33 1997
Date: Sat, 22 Feb 1997 16:00:40 -0800
To: f_estema@alcor.concordia.ca, Lyle Seaman <lws@ms.com>
From: jim bell <jimbell@pacifier.com>
Cc: cryptography@c2.net
At 11:42 PM 2/21/97 -0500, f_estema@alcor.concordia.ca wrote:
>On Fri, 21 Feb 1997, Lyle Seaman wrote:
>> According to Peter Trei:
>> >interoperate, and is a wedge to force GAK'd products
>> >into even purely domestic communications.
>snip
>>
>> I suppose this is a wedge -- lazy companies will choose to implement only
>> the one, but the second (non-GAK) protocol should be almost trivial to
>> implement -- having already done the first.
>
>It bears repeating. Once GAK is part of the software infrastructure, they
>will legislate it domestically. They also said Clipper would be voluntary
>and their FOIA-retrieved internal documents showed they were lying.
>
>This is merely another attempt at getting their foot (or should I saw
>jackboot) in the door. In the end what will matter won't be the laziness of
>companies, it will be the availability of GAK as a widespread option
>in all net software. If they get that, then they will also pass the required
>law to get only that. No more option.
That's why we're all (all, correct?!?) worried about the adoption even of
"friendly" key-escrow systems, those which are intended to allow GM to stay
in business even if one of their chief scientists bites the dust, or some
other scenario. Such systems should, I believe, come "at last" rather than
"at first." The longer they are hard to obtain, the longer non-GAK'd
encryption has to propagate and block out the alternative, and the less
likely pro-GAK laws are to be passed.
Jim Bell
jimbell@pacifier.com
