[31217] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Interesting bit of a quote
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Travis H.)
Sun Jul 16 11:15:28 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sat, 15 Jul 2006 03:24:22 -0500
From: "Travis H." <solinym@gmail.com>
To: "John Kelsey" <kelsey.j@ix.netcom.com>
Cc: "David Mercer" <radix42@gmail.com>, cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <8638356.1152949645944.JavaMail.root@elwamui-sweet.atl.sa.earthlink.net>
On 7/15/06, John Kelsey <kelsey.j@ix.netcom.com> wrote:
> Another solution is to use cryptographic audit logs. Bruce Schneier
> and I did some work on this several years ago, using a MAC to
> authenticate the current record as it's written, and a one-way
> function to derive the next key. (This idea was apparently developed
> by at least two other people independently.) Jason Holt has extended
> this idea to use digital signatures, which makes them far more
> practical. One caveat is that cryptographic audit logs only work if
> the logging machine is honest when the logs are written.
Yeah, I love that idea, saw it at the 7th Usenix Security Symposium.
For everyone else, there's an implementation here:
http://isrl.cs.byu.edu/logcrypt/index.html
I have been looking for something like this for a while.
Note to Jason Holt: The subscribe links for the mailing lists are broken.
I like the idea of encrypting the entries, but I thought that having
to classify them into a finite number of classes, and restricting
disclosure to be along class lines is restrictive, but I don't know
offhand how to allow the logger to disclose arbitrary subsets
efficiently.
--
Resolve is what distinguishes a person who has failed from a failure.
Unix "guru" for sale or rent - http://www.lightconsulting.com/~travis/ -><-
GPG fingerprint: 9D3F 395A DAC5 5CCC 9066 151D 0A6B 4098 0C55 1484
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