[33088] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Crypto to defend chip IP: snake oil or good idea?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Thor Lancelot Simon)
Sat Jul 29 14:32:38 2006
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Fri, 28 Jul 2006 13:08:45 -0400
From: Thor Lancelot Simon <tls@rek.tjls.com>
To: Anne & Lynn Wheeler <lynn@garlic.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Reply-To: tls@rek.tjls.com
In-Reply-To: <44C97C26.6060104@garlic.com>
On Thu, Jul 27, 2006 at 08:53:26PM -0600, Anne & Lynn Wheeler wrote:
>
> If you treat it as a real security chip (the kind that goes into
> smartcards and hardware token) ... it eliminates the significant
> post-fab security handling (prior to finished delivery), in part to
> assure that counterfeit / copy chips haven't been introduced into the
> stream .... with no increase in vulnerability and threat.
I don't get it. How is there "no increase in vulnerability and threat"
if a manufacturer of counterfeit / copy chips can simply read the already
generated private key out of a legitimate chip (because it's not protected
by a tamperproof module, and the "significant post-fab security handling"
has been eliminated) and make as many chips with that private key as he
may care to?
Why should I believe it's any harder to steal the private key than to
steal a "static serial number"?
Thor
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