[390] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Dorothy and the four Horseman
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Willis H. Ware)
Wed Mar 19 13:23:07 1997
To: David Hayes <david.hayes@mci.com>
cc: Brian D Williams <talon57@well.com>, cryptography@c2.net, willis@rand.org
Reply-To: willis@rand.org
In-reply-to: Your message of Tue, 18 Mar 97 13:30:07 CST.
<m0w74b2-000KkTC@switcheng.mci.com>
Date: Wed, 19 Mar 97 09:59:05 PST
From: "Willis H. Ware" <willis@rand.org>
--
Folder: YES
--
I want to contribute the following perspective to this discussion.
> .. I think it's unlikely they'll show any case where a criminal
> investigation was blocked by crypto, and they were unable to proceed
> through other means.
Be very cautious about sweeping statements like that. There are two angles
to this encryption issue so far as law enforcement is concerned:
(1) Encryption of communications traffic; e.g., telephony, datacomms
(2) Encryption of stored digital materials; e.g., files, data, HDs
The FBI et al cares most about (1) because those folks are doing
investigations; the DOJ et al cares most about (2) because they're trying
to assemble evidence for a case (e.g., white coller crime, fraud).
The evidence on (1) -- notably secure telephony -- is indeed very thin and
I suspect that commentary from Carl Ellison and others really had that
angle in mind. There are many documented cases of (2), in some of which
(as I recall) the case was weaker or non-existant because HDs or floppys
could not be decrypted. Some of the cases are in other countries.
And BTB -- there is a Memo of Understanding between the DOJ/FBI and other
agencies of government that cryptographic help can be provided to the law
enforcement community when requested. I do not know whether the MOU
provides for both case (1) and (2) above, or just (2).
Willis Ware
Santa Monica, CA
