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Date: Wed, 3 Mar 1999 16:39:58 -0500 (EST) From: Anna Lysyanskaya <anna@theory.lcs.mit.edu> To: "Michael Froomkin - U.Miami School of Law" <froomkin@law.miami.edu> Cc: cryptography@c2.net In-Reply-To: <Pine.GSO.3.96.990302220321.23032B-100000@boxster> Hello, > > The setting in the physical world: > > --------------------------------- > > 1. There is a trusted center that is able to verify the physical identity > > of whoever approaches it. The first time an individual approaches the > > system, the cost of this might be high (however I don't see how to avoid > > > My heart sank. Trouble cases are a very very small fraction of total > registrations. Everyone seems to agree that a solution that imposes high > front=end cost is a non-starter. Let me clarify. If you don't mind bogus contact info in there because presumably this is expensive, this assumption is not necessary. However, it does not seem mathematically possible for any system to meet your requirement (3), at least the way you state it, if bogus contact info is allowed. Think about it. :) Anna
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