[532] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
re: John Kelsey's post (maybe)
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Informati)
Mon Apr 14 13:37:52 1997
Date: Mon, 14 Apr 1997 13:15:11 -0400 (EDT)
From: "A. Padgett Peterson P.E. Information Security" <PADGETT@hobbes.orl.mmc.com>
To: cryptography@c2.net
I think there has been a fundamental error here (either that or the
government/escrow idea has been adopted while I was not looking). A
CA should not be able to issue keys without having other authorizations
(which I do not plan to give unilaterally).
A CA's role is to authenticate keys submitted to it. A CA may revoke the
certification *but not the key*.
This does not stop anyone from being able to issue a new key and having
the CA sign it if the CA is stupid/crooked enough to do so, but revocation
can only be done by someone who has the private key and I do not plan to
give that to any CA.
Point I am trying to make is that in order for a CA to revoke a *key*,
it must have the entire key pair and not just the public piece and that
would make the CA an escrow agent as well.
Warmly,
Padgett
