[556] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Two crypto policy articles online
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Bert-Jaap Koops)
Wed Apr 16 13:49:27 1997
From: "Bert-Jaap Koops" <E.J.Koops@kub.nl>
To: Hal Finney <hal@rain.org>, cryptography@c2.net, cypherpunks@cyberpass.net
Date: Wed, 16 Apr 1997 19:05:39 MET
Hal Finney wrote:
> We had many discussions on the cypherpunks list back in October 1996 about
> your "binding cryptography" proposal
outlining the main criticisms of the binding proposal we discussed at
the time.
I agree with most of what you say, except with your statement that the
article claims to provide a criminal-resistant PKI. It does not: it
claims to address one specific way of using a PKI for criminal
purposes; it does not address other potential (and valid) ways to
"cheat". If you read carefully, you will see that the article does not
claim that the PKI cannot be exploited by criminals. Well, granted -
we claim that criminals will not *gain* anything by using the PKI, as
we assume that people will be free to use crypto outside of the PKI
regardless. The potential merit of a binding PKI is that it provides
an acceptable crypto infrastructure for those who want it, not that
it will prevent criminals from using crypto to remain out of reach of
law enforcement.
As it's the same article and the same discussion, I'd rather not go
over it again in more detail. Those interested can read it in the cpunks
archives.
Perhaps superfluously, let me reiterate that I did not publish the
article because I think a binding PKI should be implemented, but
because I think it is an interesting and useful proposal that merits
attention and study.
Well, attention it has! :-)
Kind regards,
Bert-Jaap
