[75386] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: (Short) Intro and question
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Chris Kuethe)
Mon Jan 8 13:35:24 2007
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Sun, 7 Jan 2007 21:52:34 -0700
From: "Chris Kuethe" <chris.kuethe@gmail.com>
To: Allen <netsecurity@sound-by-design.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <45A010FC.6020507@sound-by-design.com>
On 1/6/07, Allen <netsecurity@sound-by-design.com> wrote:
> One of the questions that I have been raising is trust and how to
> ensure that that it is not misplaced or eroded over time. Which
> leads me to my question for the list: I can see easily how to do
> split key for 2 out of x for key recovery, but I can't seem to
> find a reference to the 3 out of x problem.
>
> In case I have not been clear enough, it is commonly known that
> it is harder to get collusion when three people need to act
> together than when there are just two. For most encryption 2 out
> x is just fine, but some things need a higher level of security
> than 2 out of x can provide.
http://freshmeat.net/projects/sharesecret/
http://freshmeat.net/projects/shsecret/
http://freshmeat.net/projects/ssss/
I can't speak much about them other than when I last tested them, they
were able to split and reassemble a few test cases.
CK
--
GDB has a 'break' feature; why doesn't it have 'fix' too?
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