[76354] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: It's a Presidential Mandate, Feds use it. How come you are
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Steve Schear)
Tue Jan 16 11:51:37 2007
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Tue, 16 Jan 2007 07:56:22 -0800
To: "Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>,
"Saqib Ali" <docbook.xml@gmail.com>
From: Steve Schear <s.schear@comcast.net>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
In-Reply-To: <20070116143219.362DD766072@berkshire.machshav.com>
At 06:32 AM 1/16/2007, Steven M. Bellovin wrote:
>Disk encryption, in general, is useful when the enemy has physical
>access to the disk. Laptops -- the case you describe on your page --
>do fit that category; I have no quarrel with disk encryption for them.
>It's more dubious for desktops and *much* more dubious for servers.
As governments widen their definitions of just who is a potential threat it
makes increasing sense for citizens engaged in previous innocuous
activities (especially political and financial privacy) to protect their
data from being useful if seized. This goes double for those operating
privacy-oriented services and their servers. As an example, when TOR
servers were recently seized in German raids (with the implication that
they were being used as conduits for child porn) the police knew enough to
only take the hot-swap drives (which were encrypted and therefore paper
weights after removal) if only for show. The main loss to the operators
was repair to the cage locks.
Steve
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