[77176] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: analysis and implementation of LRW
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Peter Gutmann)
Wed Jan 24 16:35:25 2007
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
X-Original-To: cryptography@metzdowd.com
From: pgut001@cs.auckland.ac.nz (Peter Gutmann)
To: cryptography@metzdowd.com, daw@cs.berkeley.edu
In-Reply-To: <200701231843.l0NIh4uu017715@taverner.cs.berkeley.edu>
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2007 14:44:59 +1300
David Wagner <daw@cs.berkeley.edu>
>Jim Hughes writes:
>> The IEEE P1619 standard group has dropped LRW mode. It has a vulnerability
>> that that are collisions that will divulge the mixing key which will reduce
>> the mode to ECB.
>
>Peter Gutmann asks:
>> Is there any more information on this anywhere? I haven't been able to find
>> anything in the P1619 archives (or at least not under an obvious heading).
>
>Alexander Klimov replies:
>>Probably <http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/msg00962.html>
>
>Huh. Was that the reason? I suspect there may have been more to it than
>that.
Actually there's a lot more to it than that, the original analysis was posted
by Quantum crypto guy Matt Ball (that's the drive manufacturer Quantum, not
quantum crypto) in late 2005:
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/msg00558.html
with a followup in early 2006:
http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1619/email/msg00588.html
So it's not a case of "google is your friend", it's "'knowing which magic
incantation to type into google to find what you're looking for' is your
friend".
Anyway, it's a pretty detailed analysis, well worth reading.
Peter.
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