[79167] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: One Laptop per Child security
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (James A. Donald)
Fri Feb 9 11:15:54 2007
Date: Fri, 09 Feb 2007 13:35:35 +1000
From: "James A. Donald" <jamesd@echeque.com>
To: Simon Josefsson <simon@josefsson.org>
CC: =?ISO-8859-2?Q?Ivan_Krsti=E6?= <krstic@solarsail.hcs.harvard.edu>,
Nicolas Williams <Nicolas.Williams@sun.com>,
"Steven M. Bellovin" <smb@cs.columbia.edu>,
Saqib Ali <docbook.xml@gmail.com>,
Metzdowd Crypto <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <87mz3o8hxp.fsf@latte.josefsson.org>
--
Simon Josefsson wrote:
> Would it be possible for one malicious web site to be
> able to access (or even influence) what is being done
> in another tab or window of the browser?
>
> If the user is talking to a bank, then that scenario
> may threaten the user's privacy.
>
> Sandboxing the browser instance for each site would
> solve that problem.
As designed, hard to VM each browser instance. If one
uses something less than VM, one relies on quite a lot
of code that one does not really understand being
correct. I do not see any alternative to this, short
of a major browser rewrite.
Ideally, there should be a separate VM responsible for
talking to each site, interpreting javascript, etc,
which is created when the conversation is started, and
shut down when one browses away from that site. Big
project. Or instead of VMing things, one could
structure the code so that automatic code checks make it
impossible to compile code that is bad in certain ways -
again a big project.
--digsig
James A. Donald
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txnLOsPeyJqwn5LYEMAdBUQoBArt6OJO8Rp8P6Vn
4GQB25JeUovLVxb1JZBHA6Q0qjCGFQGkhchihumVh
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