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Re: Full Strength Stronghold 2.0 Released Worldwide

daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Adam Shostack)
Sat May 10 14:04:01 1997

From: Adam Shostack <adam@homeport.org>
In-Reply-To: <33737230.41C6@netscape.com> from Tom Weinstein at "May 9, 97 11:51:28 am"
To: tomw@netscape.com (Tom Weinstein)
Date: Sat, 10 May 1997 11:17:23 -0400 (EDT)
Cc: adam@homeport.org, cryptography@c2.net

Tom Weinstein wrote:
| Adam Shostack wrote:

| > | Yeah.  I get a lot of mail, much of it from mailing lists.  Of
| > | course, almost none of it is encrypted today.  It would be nice if,
| > | at some time in the future, all of it were encrypted.
| > 
| >         If its on a public list, you want authentication, not
| > encryption.  Seems pretty silly to make glacier.mcom.com re-encrypt
| > each message to every member of the list.
| 
| Why not?  It makes traffic analysis much harder.
| 
| In any case, you don't have to reencrypt the whole message, just the the
| bulk key.  S/MIME handles multiple recipients by encrypting the message
| with a bulk encryption key, and then encrypting the bulk key with each
| recipient's RSA key.

	Yes, you don't have to re-encrypt the whole message, just the
expensive parts of it.  If you have a list with say, 1000 recipients,
then that is 1000 RSA ops per message.  at 1/10 of a second per, thats
100 cpu seconds per message.  That limits your list to about 860
messages per day, ignoring the cost of running a mail program.  If you
take a mailing list like firewalls, with 10000 or so members, you're
talking about 86 messages per day maximum.  Firewalls has gone over
that on a regular basis.

	I don't see how it makes traffic analysis any harder on an
open list which anyone can subscribe to.

Adam

-- 
"It is seldom that liberty of any kind is lost all at once."
					               -Hume



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