[87336] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: Was a mistake made in the design of AACS?
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Florian Weimer)
Wed May 2 16:38:03 2007
From: Florian Weimer <fw@deneb.enyo.de>
To: "Perry E. Metzger" <perry@piermont.com>
Cc: cryptography@metzdowd.com
Date: Wed, 02 May 2007 22:34:49 +0200
In-Reply-To: <873b2f2gel.fsf@snark.piermont.com> (Perry E. Metzger's message
of "Wed, 02 May 2007 15:07:30 -0400")
* Perry E. Metzger:
> This seems to me to be, yet again, an instance where failure to
> consider threat models is a major cause of security failure.
Sorry, but where's the security failure? Where can you buy hardware
devices that can copy HD disks? Or download software that does, with
a readily usable interface?
In that sense, even CSS hasn't really been broken.
Even the flurry of DMCA takedown notices isn't necessarily a bad move.
It might help to shape the future of how access to content is
regulated in some very particular way.
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