[88270] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
Re: More info in my AES128-CBC question
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Travis H.)
Sat May 12 09:06:09 2007
Date: Wed, 9 May 2007 18:12:23 -0500
From: "Travis H." <travis+ml-cryptography@subspacefield.org>
To: Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
Mail-Followup-To: Cryptography <cryptography@metzdowd.com>
In-Reply-To: <Pine.SOL.4.61.0705091804450.1775@mental>
--8M+BMcg+0CmQ2H7L
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii
Content-Disposition: inline
Content-Transfer-Encoding: quoted-printable
On Wed, May 09, 2007 at 06:11:03PM -0400, Leichter, Jerry wrote:
> Just being able to generate traffic over the link isn't enough to
> carry out this attack.
Well, it depends on if you key per-flow or just once for the link. If
the latter, and you have the ability to create traffic over the link,
and there's a 1-for-1 correspondence between plaintext and encrypted
packets, then you have a problem.
Scenarios include:
Private wifi network, you are sending packets at a customer from
unprivileged node on internet; you want known plaintext for the key
used to secure the wifi traffic, or you want the contents of his
connection.
Target is VPN'ed into corporate headquarters, you are sending packets
at them (or you send them email, they download it from their mail server)
--=20
Kill dash nine, and its no more CPU time, kill dash nine, and that
process is mine. -><- <URL:http://www.subspacefield.org/~travis/>
For a good time on my UBE blacklist, email john@subspacefield.org.
--8M+BMcg+0CmQ2H7L
Content-Type: application/pgp-signature
Content-Disposition: inline
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
Version: GnuPG v1.4.2.1 (OpenBSD)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=Zvnt
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--8M+BMcg+0CmQ2H7L--
---------------------------------------------------------------------
The Cryptography Mailing List
Unsubscribe by sending "unsubscribe cryptography" to majordomo@metzdowd.com
