[10372] in cryptography@c2.net mail archive
RE: Losing the Code War by Stephen Budiansky
daemon@ATHENA.MIT.EDU (Trei, Peter)
Mon Feb 4 13:58:41 2002
Message-ID: <F504A8CEE925D411AF4A00508B8BE90A01E90C07@exna07.securitydynamics.com>
From: "Trei, Peter" <ptrei@rsasecurity.com>
To: "'Joshua Hill'" <josh@untruth.org>
Cc: marius <marius.corbu@analog.com>,
"'Ben Laurie'" <ben@algroup.co.uk>, cryptography@wasabisystems.com
Date: Mon, 4 Feb 2002 12:50:43 -0500
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain
> Joshua Hill[SMTP:josh@untruth.org] wrote:
>
>
> marius wrote:
> > Not quite true. Encrypting each message twice would not increase the
> > "effective" key size to 112 bits.
> > There is an attack named "meet in the middle" which will make the
> > effective key size to be just 63 bits.
>
> Peter Trei wrote:
> > Don't forget that the MITM attack (which Schneier claims
> > takes 2^(2n) = 2^112 time), also requires 2^56 blocks
> > of storage.
> [...]
> > I don't lose sleep over MITM attacks on 3DES.
>
> Unless I'm mistaken, the 2^63 operation MITM attack referenced in the
> original message referred to Double-DES, not Triple-DES. The original
> cited value of 2^63 is incorrect; the Double-DES MITM attack (as proposed
> by Merkle and Hellman) is a known plaintext attack that takes 2^57
> operations, with 2^56 blocks of storage.
>
> Your provided values are correct for attacking Triple-DES, but I don't
> think that's what the original author was referring to.
>
> Josh
>
Either way, my point stands: any attack which requires 2^56 blocks
of storage is probably intractable for the time being, imho. 10 years
from now, I'm not so sure.
Peter Trei
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